Darfur Peace Agreement: On May 5, 2006, under strong pressure from the A.U., the U.S. and others in the international community, the Sudanese government and one rebel faction (SLA/M-MM) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria. However, other rebel groups found the DPA inadequate in addressing Darfuri grievances and refused to sign. The violence in Darfur has not subsided since the signing of the DPA. In August 2006, Sudanese government forces launched a major offensive in northern Darfur. That attack was quickly bogged down in the face of successful rebel counterattacks, achieving little other than renewed hostilities. While it quickly became clear that a military victory for Khartoum is impossible, the attempt to achieve victory made progress towards a peaceful solution nearly impossible. The U.N. and A.U. are currently working together to try to revitalize a political process to bring all parties back to the table to work on a revised and improved DPA. This effort is being hampered by rebel disunity and by government obstruction. The Sudanese air force repeatedly bombed locations where rebels were to meet under U.N./A.U. auspices to unify their positions in order to negotiate properly.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706: The United Nations has passed 16 resolutions on Darfur. One of the most important was Resolution 1706 of August 31, 2006, that authorized a robust U.N. peacekeeping force of 22,500 troops for Darfur with a mandate to protect its civilian population. Due to Sudanese stonewalling and a failure of U.N. member states to enforce their will, less than 200 U.N. advisors actually deployed.

U.N. Human Rights Council: A high-level mission of the United Nations Human Rights Council, led by Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams, issued a report on March 7, 2007, which stated: “The situation [in Darfur] is characterized by gross and systemic violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The principal pattern is one of a violent counterinsurgency campaign waged by the Government of Sudan in concert with Janjaweed militia, targeting mostly civilians.” Sudan sought to have the report rejected by the Council because the mission had not visited Darfur – which was true, but only because Sudan refused to issue visas to the mission members. That effort to quash the report failed. A new high-level delegation was appointed to follow up with a visit to Sudan and report back to the Council’s next session this summer.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769: The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1769 unanimously on July 31, 2007. It determined that the situation in Darfur constitutes a threat to peace, and authorized the deployment of a United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VIIof the U.N. Charter. UNAMID will be the largest United Nations multilateral peacekeeping force ever deployed, with a total presence of more than 31,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel. When deployed, UNAMID will have the authority to “take the necessary action” to: (1) support early and effective implementation of the DPA, prevent disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and most importantly to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan, and (2) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers. Full deployment of the force is not expected until mid-2008. It is estimated that UNAMID will cost roughly $2.5 billion a year, in addition to start-up costs. U.N. member states will fund the mission through the U.N. assessment scale. The United States will contribute 27.1% of the total costs. If the U.N. fails to successfully deploy a peacekeeping force in Darfur, it will be the second time in that institution’s history that U.N. troops have not deployed after being authorized to do so by the Security Council. The first such instance was the failure to deploy troops in Darfur as mandated by Resolution 1706.

Ceasefire: There needs to be a ceasefire respected by all parties to the conflict. There have been cease-fires agreed to in the past, notably in the 2006 DPA and again when New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson visited Khartoum in January 2007, but all parties violated them. The international community must back the U.N. and A.U. envoys as they work for an internal political negotiating process, including a viable ceasefire respected by all actors.

Effective and Credible Peacekeeping Force to Protect Civilians: The full U.N./A.U. hybrid peacekeeping force established by Resolution 1769 needs to be deployed urgently to protect the civilian population. The first benchmark of UNSCR 1769 has already been missed; U.N. member states were supposed to finalize their contributions to UNAMID and the U.N. Secretary-General and the Chairman of the A.U. commission were expected to agree on the final composition of the military component of UNAMID no later than August 30, 2007.

A renewed Darfur peace process: In order to achieve a permanent end to the genocide in Darfur, the effort to find a political solution must be renewed. A peace agreement must create the following four conditions: (1) a secure environment that allows displaced persons to return to their homes-if they chose to do so; (2) a sustainable political agreement embraced by all armed groups–as well as noncombatant groups representative of large portions of Darfuri society – which deals with the root causes of the conflict; (3) a cessation and reversal of resettlement efforts underway by the Government of Sudan; and (4) accountability for all those who committed or can be shown to have had command responsibility7 over violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. A renewed and inclusive peace process must begin immediately, must include all the necessary stakeholders, and must ensure a voice for the people of Darfur themselves. While said efforts should be led by the U.N. and A.U. envoys, the United States and other key international actors must reinforce their work by sustained engagement and pressure on the Government and rebel groups.

World leaders must make peace in Darfur a top priority: It has been over two years since President Bush declared the situation in Darfur genocide, and yet it continues. The President and his administration have made little progress; the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. The performance of nearly all other world leaders, with few exceptions, has been even worse. The situation in Darfur demands more than tough rhetoric. The President must take a leadership role in maintaining a coalition of key international actors to force Khartoum to end the killing. Arab and African leaders must also take on a proactive role in mediating an end to this crisis that has brewed in their midst for nearly half a decade now. In the immediate term, all U.N. member states must participate, whether financially, logistically, or through troop or equipment contributions to a swift and effective deployment of the hybrid force authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769.

China must use its leverage with Khartoum: China has a great deal of influence on Sudan given its status as Sudan’s top trading partner, its strong military ties to Sudan, and its protective role in the U.N. Security Council. Although China did not exercise its veto, as it had vowed to do early on, and voted for Resolution 1769, it did significantly weaken the final text of the resolution. China’s vote in favor of 1769 came only after it managed to remove language calling for sanctions if Sudan fails to cooperate. Additionally, the hybrid force’s mandate to “seize and dispose” of weapons found in Darfur in contravention of the arms embargo (UNSCR 1556/2004) was diluted in the final text, allowing the force to merely “monitor” them. China has displayed increased unease and engagement regarding Darfur, but more must be done. China is deeply image-conscious, especially with regard to the growing possibility that the 2008 Olympic Games will be marred by Darfur-related activities. Chinese oil investments in Sudan, which benefit the regime but not the people and help fund government military operations in Darfur, are also susceptible to pressure through the growing global divestment movement. All this leverage needs to be consistently applied to China, which is in a unique position to influence Khartoum’s calculations.

Humanitarian Aid: Humanitarian aid in Darfur must be sustained while efforts are made to protect civilians and broker an agreement for a lasting end to the conflict. This means continued funding of aid programs and an international push to end Sudan’s obstruction of aid efforts. The Government of Sudan is also guilty of innumerable violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, which have hampered the effective delivery of aid. Such actions must be brought to an end immediately. Given repeated U.N. and NGO warnings of the fragility of their efforts, the international community must prepare a contingency plan for a collapse of current aid programs.

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